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HIS Article summarizes developments during the 1986 Survey period
in Texas commercial law and related subjects affecting commercial
practice.' In general, 1986 was an active year in commercial law,
especially in the area of banking litigation. For ease of reference, this Article
follows the organization of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in
Texas and codified in the Texas Business & Commerce Code (the Code).2
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS-ACCELERATION AND
PREPAYMENT CLAUSES
A. Acceleration Must Be in Good Faith
Lack of Good Faith as a Defense. Under section 1.208 of the Code, 3 a credi-
tor may use a general insecurity clause to accelerate the balance due on an
instrument. The only statutory restriction on the use of such a clause is that
the acceleration must be made in good faith.4 In Jack M. Finley, Inc. v.
*B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Texas
Tech University.
1. Related subjects of particular note during the survey period are governed by the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp.
1987), and the federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. I 1986).
2. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp.
1987). The chapters in the Code are organized as follows: Chapter 1, General Provisions;
Chapter 2, Sales; Chapter 3, Commercial Paper; Chapter 4, Bank Deposits and Collections;
Chapter 5, Letters of Credit; Chapter 6, Bulk Sales; Chapter 7, Documents of Title; Chapter 8,
Investment Securities; and Chapter 9, Secured Transactions.
3. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.208 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
4. Id. In addition to the substantive statutory restriction of good faith, the case law has
added procedural restrictions requiring notice of an intent to accelerate and notice that the
acceleration has occurred. See, e.g., Ogden v. Gibraltar Say. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233-34
(Tex. 1982) (holder failed to give unequivocal notice of intent to accelerate); Baldazo v. Villa
Oldsmobile, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ) (holder's equivo-
cal notice of intent to accelerate was inadequate); McGowan v. Pasol, 605 S.W.2d 728, 732
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (acceptance of late payments does not waive
right to accelerate future payments; notice of intent to accelerate future payments must be
given). Several cases have held that notices can be waived by appropriate language in the
original note. See, e.g., Emfinger v. Pumpco, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1985, no writ) (express waiver of notice of intent to accelerate held effective despite acceptance
of late payments); Slivka v. Swiss Ave. Bank, 653 S.W.2d 939, 940-41 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, no writ) (express waiver of notice of intent to accelerate and notice of acceleration held
effective). But see Cruce v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 696 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1985, no writ) (Howell, J., dissenting) (contractual waivers of equitable rights should not be
effective). The arguments for and against waivers of acceleration notices are discussed in
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Longview Bank & Trust Co. 5 the court held that the creditor was entitled to
summary judgment when the debtor failed to oppose the motion for sum-
mary judgment with any evidence of probative value.6 The mere statement
of a general conclusion by the debtor that the creditor had not acted in good
faith was not sufficient to carry the debtor's burden of proof.
Lack of Good Faith as a Claim. Although a lack of good faith may be raised
as a defense to the acceleration of a note, a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing cannot be used as a claim against the accelerating creditor. 7 In Cluck v.
Frost National Bank 8 the bank accelerated a note and deed of trust after a
default in payments. After the foreclosure sale one of two joint debtors of-
fered to pay the deficiency on condition that the creditor transfer the note
and deed of trust to him. The creditor bank refused this offer on the ground
that the bank had a policy against selling notes to individuals. The debtor
then made a second offer by tendering full payment of the deficiency, includ-
ing principal, interest, and attorney's fees. This tender was also refused, but
on the ground that the note had already been sold, apparently to an individ-
ual. In an action by the bank to recover the remaining amount due on the
note the debtor counterclaimed for breach of a duty of good faith and fair
dealing. The court ruled that Texas has refused to recognize such a duty as
the basis for a cause of action and held that the bank was not liable for
refusing the offers of payment.9 The opinion is not clear on whether the
debtor was only tendering payment of past due installments or was tendering
payment of the entire note.10
Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 187, 187-91
(1986).
5. 705 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
6. Id. at 209.
7. Cluck v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 714 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no
writ).
8. 714 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
9. Id. at 410.
10. Early in the opinion the court states, '[O]n May 12, 1983, appellant offered to pay the
deficiency on the condition that the bank transfer the note and lien to him." Id. at 409. In the
next paragraph the court says, "[A]ppellant then unconditionally tendered full payment for all
principal, interest, and attorney's fees owing on the deficiency." Id. Because the bank had
already accelerated the note, these comments sound as if the debtor was tendering payment of
the entire note, although the language used by the court is not free from doubt. Toward the
end of the opinion, however, the court says, "[T]he note became due upon acceleration and
appellant lost the right to pay all delinquent payments and reinstate the original maturity
date." Id. at 410. This passage is a clear statement of a more limited tender of payment, and it
is followed a few sentences later by, "[T]he only issue is whether the bank had a right to refuse
the maker's tender of full payment after default and sell the delinquent note to a third party."
Id.
If the debtor was only tendering payment of past due installments, the court could have
found some support for its position by analogy to TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.506
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987), which provides: "At any time before the secured party has
disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for its disposition . . . the debtor . . . may
unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment
of all obligations secured by the collateral." (Emphasis added.) If the debtor was tendering full
payment of the entire note, the court did not deal with the effect of id. § 3.604, which states:
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II. SALES OF GOODS
A. Enforceability of Sales Contracts
Statute of Frauds. Section 2.201 of the Code" 1 requires that contracts for the
sale of goods in the amount of $500 or more must be evidenced by a writing
"sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought."' 12 The
contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity of goods shown in the writ-
ing. 13 In Mel- Tex Valve, Inc. v. Rio Supply Co., 14 the buyer introduced in
evidence an unsigned purchase order that the buyer had generated internally
but had never sent to the seller. The court held that the unsigned purchase
order was insufficient to satisfy the writing requirement of the statute of
frauds.15 The disappointed seller also attempted to fit the case into the spe-
cially manufactured goods exception. 16 The court ruled, however, that there
was no evidence to show that the goods were manufactured only for this
particular buyer, especially since the seller had testified that the goods were
suitable for resale to others. 17 The buyer's motion for summary judgment
was granted. 18
In Micromedia v. Automated Broadcast Controls 19 the buyer, rather than
the seller, ran afoul of the Code's statute of frauds. In Micromedia the seller
"Any party making tender of full payment to a holder when or after it is due is discharged to
the extent of all subsequent liability for interest, costs and attorney's fees."
In addition to having an unclear statement of facts, the opinion is unsatisfactory on two
substantive legal grounds. First, the court relies for its holding on earlier Texas cases that
arose in quite distinguishable factual contexts, citing Exxon Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
678 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. 1984), and English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983).
Exxon involved an issue that was specifically covered in the contract itself. English concerned
a Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12)
(Vernon Supp. 1987) between attorneys who were both parties to a contract. Equal bargaining
power was, therefore, not an issue. A concurring opinion in English noted this point and
suggested that the majority opinion only covered this limited circumstance. 660 S.W.2d at 525
(Spears, J., concurring). Second, the Cluck opinion is unsatisfactory because the court refused
to accept the argument that RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) applied in
the case. That section provides that: "[E]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." Id. Although the court
may have been correct in its rejection of the Restatement provision as an accurate statement of
Texas law, the court failed to mention TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968), which contains almost identical language and is a part of Texas law by legisla-
tive enactment. Because Cluck dealt with a note, a form of commercial paper covered by the
Code, see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(b)(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), § 1.203
was applicable to the case, and the court should have discussed it. The reason for the omission
cannot be determined from the opinion.
11. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
12. Id. § 2.201(a).
13. Id.
14. 710 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
15. Id. at 186.
16. This exception appears in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(c)(1) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968), which provides: "(c) A contract ... is enforceable (1) if the goods are to be
specifically manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary
course of the seller's business ... 
17. 710 S.W.2d at 187.
18. Id.
19. 799 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1986).
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of radio broadcasting equipment provided the buyer with a written price
quotation for the type of equipment desired by the buyer. The court rejected
this writing as insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds because it was an
offer for a future agreement, not a memorandum of an existing contract.
20
According to the court, the statutory language requiring a writing that indi-
cates "a contract for sale has been made"21 disqualified the price quotation
as an adequate writing.22 The buyer also contended that the statute of
frauds did not apply in this case because the seller had admitted the exist-
ence of a contract in the court proceedings. The court rejected this argu-
ment because the admission went only to the buyer's purchase of a different
system and did not admit the existence of the primary contract underlying
the buyer's claim.23
B. Warranties
Warranties and the DTPA. Both the Code and the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (DTPA)24 permit actions founded on breach of warranty. 25 In
cases governed by Chapter 2 of the Code a property drafted waiver or dis-
claimer of warranties can effectively bar a warranty action under either the
Code or the DTPA. 26 In Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Davis,27 however,
the court held that an "as is" disclaimer of warranty is not effective to waive
a separate cause of action for misrepresentation under the DTPA.28 The
damages allowed by the court are a particularly interesting aspect of Metro
Ford. Basing its decision on the earlier case of Luna v. North Star Dodge
Sales, Inc.,29 the court granted recovery for the difference in value of the
20. Id. at 234.
21. Id. (construing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)
(emphasis by the court)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 235.
24. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
25. See id. §§ 2.714-.715 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) and id. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1987) (Texas DTPA).
26. See Singleton v. LaCoure, 712 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (disclaimers of implied warranties requiring buyer's acknowledgment
effective to bar both Code and DTPA claims); Ellmer v. Delaware Mini-Computer Sys., Inc.,
665 S.W.2d 158, 160-61 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (same result); see also McCrea v.
Cubilla Condominium Corp., 685 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (disclaimer of implied warranty effective to bar DTPA claim when Code not ap-
plied).
In contrast to a disclaimer that prevents the creation of a warranty, a limitation of remedies
clause or a limitation of liabilities clause recognizes a warranty but limits the relief available
for the warranty's breach under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968). A limitation of remedies clause or a limitation of liabilities clause will not, however,
limit the relief available under a DTPA claim. Id. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1987). See Martin v.
Lou Poliquin Enters., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
27. 709 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth), aff'd on rehearing, 711 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
28. 709 S.W.2d at 790. This holding is similar to that of the court in Reliance Universal,
Inc. v. Sparks Indus. Servs., Inc., 688 S.W.2d 890, 892-93 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
29. 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. 1984).
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goods as delivered and as represented, the loss of use of the goods following
repossession, lost earnings, mental anguish, lost credit, and additional puni-
tive damages under the treble damage provision of the DTPA.30 A judg-
ment for the buyer in the total amount of $534,016 was affirmed.31
An issue related to the contractual waiver of warranties is the existence of
a statutory procedure limiting the buyer's right immediately to bring a
breach of warranty action. Under the Texas Manufactured Housing Stan-
dards Act, 32 a buyer may not maintain an action for breach of warranty
provisions contained in the Act until the seller has been given an opportu-
nity to cure defects and the buyer has exhausted the administrative remedies
available within the Department of Labor and Standards. 33 This limitation
is significant because failure to comply with the warranty provisions of the
Act or with any implied warranties expressly violates the DTPA.3 4 In
Holder v. Wood 35 a disappointed married couple who had purchased a mo-
bile home sought recovery for breach of express and implied warranties
without exhausting their administrative remedies under the act. The lower
court granted a plea in abatement to prevent the buyers from maintaining
their action until the administrative procedures were satisfied.36 The
supreme court held that the abatement was proper so far as the express war-
ranty claim was concerned, 37 but further held that the Manufactured Hous-
ing Standards Act only required the purchaser to follow the administrative
procedure for claims based on express warranties. 38 The purchaser could
still maintain claims based on implied warranties or misrepresentation with-
out regard to the administrative procedure. 39 The lower court was in-
structed to lift the abatement order on the implied warranty claims not
covered by the Act.40
Notice of Warranty Breach. Section 2.607 of the Code4 requires a buyer to
notify the seller of an alleged breach of warranty within a reasonable time or
suffer the loss of any remedy for the breach. In Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial
30. 709 S.W.2d at 790-95. As an aside to the Metro Ford case, the decision in Sierra
Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 789 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986), is worth noting.
In Sierra, a bankruptcy action, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a debtor's claim
for emotional distress was property of the debtor's estate, regardless of whether such a claim
was transferrable or assignable under state law. Id. at 708-09. If this decision is followed in
the Fifth Circuit, a bankruptcy trustee can probably recover damages for mental anguish in
DTPA cases for the benefit of the estate of a bankrupt plaintiff.
31. 709 S.W.2d at 795.
32. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
33. Id. art. 5221f, § 17(d).
34. Id.
35. 714 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. 1986).





41. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(c)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides:
"(c) Where a tender has been accepted (1) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he
discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from
any remedy ...."
19871
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Park42 the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged a conflict between the lower
Texas courts on the question of whether a buyer is required to notify only his
or her immediate seller of an alleged breach of warranty to preserve a claim
against a remote seller or manufacturer, 43 or whether a buyer must also no-
tify each remote seller or manufacturer in order to preserve a claim for
breach of warranty against it.44 In an opinion denying an application for
writ of error the Supreme Court held that it did not need to resolve the
conflict because, on the facts before it, the buyer did not prove a breach of
warranty.45 Pending resolution of this conflict between the courts of ap-
peals, the only safe course for a buyer is to notify every seller or manufac-
turer in the chain of distribution to insure that a later warranty claim is not
barred by a procedural defect in the giving of notice.
Liability of Dealer for Manufacturer's Warranty. In Doran Chevrolet-
Peugeot, Inc. v. Ganschow46 the court held that a car dealer was not liable
under a warranty running from the manufacturer to the buyer when the
dealer acted only as the agent of the manufacturer for the purpose of deter-
mining whether repairs were covered under the manufacturer's warranty.4 7
The dealer was apparently not the dealer that sold the car.
Warranties of Future Performance. Some years ago the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed the question of whether under Texas law an implied
warranty of merchantability extends to the future performance of goods.48
Finding no Texas cases on the subject, the court conjectured that Texas
would probably follow the rule adopted in other jurisdictions that an implied
warranty does not extend to future performance because the Code requires a
warranty of future performance explicitly to extend the warranty coverage
and, by its very nature, "an implied warranty... cannot 'explicitly extend to
future performance'. . . .- 49 In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp. 50
the Texas Supreme Court confirmed the Fifth Circuit's "best guess" and
adopted the majority rule that implied warranties do not extend to the future
performance of goods.5 1 The Texas Supreme Court also held that whether
an express warranty given by the seller was an explicit warranty of future
performance was a question of fact when the goods concerned, roofing
materials, were described as being "bondable up to 20 years."'52 The issue of
42. 701 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1986).
43. The court of appeals in Vintage Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ), reached this result.
44. See Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park, 696 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1985), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 701 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1986).
45. 701 S.W.2d at 843.
46. 701 S.W.2d at 260 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
47. Id. at 261.
48. Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320, 1325 (5th Cir. 1981).
49. Id.
50. 710 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1986).
51. Id. at 546. The rule adopted in Safeway was applied to bar a consumer's claim for
breach of express warranty. Roy v. Armco, Union Wire Rope Div., 636 F. Supp. 839 (E.D.
Tex. 1986).
52. 710 S.W.2d at 548.
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warranty coverage arose because the defects were discovered nine years after
the sale, a time well beyond the four-year limitations period for the sale of
goods under the Code.53
C. Performance Disputes
Acceptance and Revocation of Acceptance. The Code establishes an elaborate
scheme for the tender, rejection, and revocation of acceptance of goods.54 In
general, if the buyer revokes his acceptance he must prove a greater noncon-
formity in the goods than the buyer has to prove if the buyer rejects the
goods. At the acceptance stage the buyer can reject the goods if the tender
"fail[s] in any respect to conform to the contract, ' ' 55 and the buyer is entitled
to a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods before accepting them.56
To revoke acceptance, the buyer must show, among other things, a substan-
tial impairment of the value of the goods.57 In Tri-Continental Leasing
Corp. v. Law Office of Richard W. Burns58 the court applied the rejection
standards of the Code by analogy to a lease transaction and held that the
lessee of a copying machine was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to in-
spect the goods before acceptance would be effective.59 The buyer's mere
signing of a delivery and acceptance receipt purporting to acknowledge full
inspection and good working condition was not binding without an actual
opportunity to inspect.60 The court also held that warranty disclaimers con-
tained in the lease were unconscionable when the buyer did not know how to
operate the goods and when the value of the goods and the consideration
paid were grossly disparate. 6'
In Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis62 the buyer successfully met the greater
proof requirements for revocation of acceptance even though twenty months
had passed from the time of sale. The buyer showed that revocation was
delayed because of the seller's repeated promises to cure the defects in the
buyer's automobile when, in fact, repeated attempts at repair failed to cure
53. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
54. See id. §§ 2.601-.602, .608.
55. Id. § 2.601. The application of this provision of the Code is discussed in Printing
Center of Texas, Inc. v. Supermind Publishing Co., 669 S.W.2d 779, 783-84 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) and Texas Imports v. Allday, 649 S.W.2d 730, 737-38
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.606(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
57. Id. § 2.608(a) provides:
(a) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose
non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(1) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and
it has not been seasonably cured; or
(2) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reason-
ably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the
seller's assurances.
58. 710 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
59. Id. at 608.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 607.
62. 704 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, per curiam,
709 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1986).
1987]
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the defects. The continued use of the car by the buyer after revocation did
not bar revocation when the buyer was willing to pay for such use at a rea-
sonable rate.63 The Vista Chevrolet case contains a careful analysis of the
standards for revocation of acceptance and is, therefore, a helpful case on
that subject.
D. Consignments
Secured Creditors Can Sometimes Lose to Consignors. One of the primary
risks for a consignor of goods is that a secured creditor will take priority
over the consignor in goods delivered to a debtor-consignee. 64 While section
2.326 of the Code 65 does provide some exceptions to this usual outcome, 66
consignors do not generally fare well in contests with secured parties.67 The
case of Brashear v. D Cross B, Inc. ,68 however, is an example of a very lucky
consignor. In Brashear the jury found that the consignor had proven that
the consignee was generally known by his creditors to be engaged in selling
the goods of others. 69 In a rather opaque opinion the court held that be-
cause of this jury finding the consigner's claim prevailed over the claim of a
secured creditor.70
E. Statute of Limitations
Statute of Limitations Begins to Run When Sale Occurs. Despite some ear-
lier confusion introduced by Garcia v. Texas Instruments71 concerning the
time when the statute of limitations starts to run in warranty actions involv-
ing contracts for the sale of goods, 72 the lower Texas courts have made it
63. 709 S.W.2d at 176. In its per curiam opinion the supreme court upheld the revocation
of acceptance, but reversed and rendered judgment against the plaintiff on a DTPA claim
because the buyer failed to satisfy his burden of proof on that issue. Id.
64. See, e.g., Home Say. Ass'n v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 708 P.2d 280, 285-86 (Nev.
1985) (secured inventory financer took priority over consignor); Martin v. First Nat'l Bank,
127 Ill. App. 3d 485, 468 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (1984) (secured creditor took priority over con-
signor of automobiles); Fuller v. Texas W. Fin. Corp., 635 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (assignee is secured creditor and takes priority over original retailer).
65. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.326(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
66. Id. The exceptions are: (1) compliance with an applicable sign law allowing the inter-
est of the consignor to be evidenced by a sign; (2) proof that the person conducting the busi-
ness is generally known to his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling consigned goods;
and (3) compliance with the filing provisions of chapter 9 of the Code (TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 9.114, .408 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987)). Id. § 2.32(c)(l)-(3).
67. See, e.g., Home Say. Ass'n v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 708 P.2d 280 (Nev. 1985);
Martin v. First Nat'l Bank, 127 Ill. App. 3d 485, 468 N.E.2d 1002 (1984).
68. 711 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
69. Id. at 751.
70. Id.
71. 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980).
72. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides that
the statute of limitations begins to run on a warranty claim when tender of delivery is made.
Garcia contained some language suggesting that in an action for personal injury the limitations
period would begin when the injury occurred. 610 S.W.2d at 465. This dictum may have led
to erroneous decisions in Garvie v. Duo-Fast Corp., 711 F.2d 47, 48 (5th Cir. 1983) (statute of
limitations period began to run when injury occurred) and Cleveland v. Square-D Co., 613
S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (same).
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plain that they agree in their interpretation of section 2.725 of the Code73
that tender of delivery is the triggering event for the Code's four-year limita-
tions period.74 Two recent cases support this reading of the Code.75
III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Form of Instruments
Incomplete Instruments. According to the court in Thomas C. Cook, Inc. v.
Rowhanian 76 traveler's checks do not become instruments until the identifi-
cation signature is placed upon them and, until then, no claim can arise on
the checks.77 In Cook the plaintiff had purchased $20,100 worth of travel-
ers' checks from a street broker in Iran. The checks were subsequently sto-
len, and the plaintiff sought to recover their value from the issuer, Thomas
Cook, Inc., under the contract of sale. The plaintiff testified that the identifi-
cation signature was not on the checks. On these facts the court held that
the plaintiff could not qualify as the owner of a lost instrument under section
3.804 of the Code. 78
A second and more common risk associated with incomplete instruments
is illustrated in FDIC v. McClanahan.79 Defendant McClanahan had signed
a blank note and left it with one Orrin Shaid, "a 'charismatic 300-pound east
Texan,' ",80 who represented himself as the owner of the Ranchlander Bank.
The note was signed with the understanding that it would later be completed
to represent the amount of a loan McClanahan had requested from the bank.
Shaid subsequently told McClanahan that the loan application had been de-
nied. McClanahan, inexplicably, did not request return of the incomplete
note. The temptation to make personal use of McClanahan's signed, blank
note was apparently too much for Shaid, who had, to the knowledge of Mc-
Clanahan, once been convicted of bank fraud. Shaid completed the note in
the amount of $62,500, to reflect a loan from Ranchlander to McClanahan
and took the money for himself. An accomplice subsequently turned Shaid
in to the FBI, the bank was declared insolvent, and Shaid's dealings with the
note came to light. By this time, the FDIC had acquired the note as receiver
of the failed bank and asserted a right to recover against McClanahan. The
court noted that this was apparently the first decision in the Fifth Circuit
73. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
74. See, e.g., Cooper v. RepublicBank, 696 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no
writ) (statute of limitations begins to run when tender is made); Weeks v. J.I. Case Co., 694
S.W.2d 634, 635-36 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ) (statute of limitations began to run
upon delivery of farm equipment); Fitzgerald v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 683 S.W.2d 162, 165(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statute of limitations period began when
employer received forklift).
75. Madden v. J.1. Case Co., 712 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1986, no writ) (statute of limitations period began on date of delivery); Wyatt v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 703 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christ 1985, no writ) (statute of limita-
tions period began on date of purchase and delivery).
76. 700 S.W.2d 672 (rex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. Id. at 674.
78. Id. (construing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.804 (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)).
79. 795 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1986).
80. Id. at 513.
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raising the question of whether the estoppel rule of D'Oench, Duhme & Co.
v. FDIC 81 applied "to a maker who signed a blank promissory note with the
understanding that it would later be filled in to reflect the terms of a loan
that he in fact never received." '82 Noting that a rule83 similar to that of
D'Oench, Duhme has been applied in other cases to estop makers of incom-
plete instruments from raising the defense of fraud in the inducement, 84 the
court held that the estoppel rule should operate against McClanahan since
his conduct was at least reckless and he, instead of the bank's uninsured
creditors or depositors, should bear any loss in the transaction.85
B. Liability of Parties
Signatures of Representatives. Numerous Texas cases have involved the issue
of whether a party has signed a negotiable instrument of guaranty as a prin-
cipal or only as an agent.86 In the recent case of Gulf & Basco Co. v.
Buchanan 8 7 the court held that where a corporate officer's capacity in sign-
ing a guaranty is ambiguous, then parol evidence between immediate parties
to the transaction showing that a corporate officer had guaranteed payment
of a corporate debt only in his corporate capacity is admissible.88
Consideration to the Obligor Supports Obligation of a Surety. It is elementary
commercial law that a surety need not receive any independent considera-
tion to be bound on the surety obligation.8 9 It is equally elementary that the
holder of an instrument may proceed against the surety without first resort-
ing to the principal unless the parties agree to the contrary. 90 In Duke v.
81. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
82. 795 F.2d at 516. In D'Oench, Duhme the court held that a maker of a note may not
raise the defense of fraud if the note would tend to have the effect of deceiving creditors. 315
U.S. at 460-61.
83. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1982). This statutory estoppel rule is applicable to suits brought
by the FDIC in its corporate capacity.
84. See, e.g., FDIC v. Langley, 792 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1986) (12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)
(1982) estoppel rules barred defense based on maker's side agreements with banks); FDIC v.
Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34, 38 (6th Cir. 1985) (maker could not raise defense of fraud when he left
bank with signed notes and allowed bank to fill in terms); FDIC v. Powers, 576 F. Supp. 1167,
1171-72 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (both § 1823(e) and D'Oench common law estoppel rules applied to
bar maker's defense of fraud), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1076 (7th Cir. 1984).
85. 795 F.2d at 516.
86. See, e.g., Griffin v. Ellinger, 538 S.W.2d 97, 100-01 (Tex. 1976) (president of corpora-
tion held personally liable); Seale v. Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251, 255 (Tex. 1974) (signer of prom-
issory note who did not reveal his representative capacity to the party receiving the note held
personally liable); Byrd v. Southwest Multi-Copy, Inc., 693 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tex. App.-
Houston (14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (summary judgment entered against signer for failure to
overcome presumption of individual liability); A. Duda & Sons, Inc. v. Madera, 687 S.W.2d
83-85 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ) (failure to support allegation of repre-
sentative capacity at trial resulted in personal judgment against signer).
87. 707 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
88. Id. at 658.
89. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-14, at 523-24 (2d
ed. 1980).
90. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (guar-
anty of payment) with id. § 3.416(b) (guaranty of collection). Under these provisions a guar-
anty of payment can be enforced without resort to any other party while a guaranty of
collection first requires an attempt to collect from the maker. If the words of guaranty do not
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First Nat'l Bank 91 the court applied these basic principles without difficulty
to hold the defendant liable on his guaranty. 92
Statute of Limitations on Promissory Notes. In Siegler v. France93 the court
held that the general four-year statute of limitations for actions founded on
contracts applies to notes and begins to run on the day of maturity stated in
the note. 94 If the note also permits a demand for payment at an earlier time,
the statute begins to run when the demand is made. 95
Liability of Acceptors. Section 3.409 of the Code96 clearly states that a
drawee is not liable on a draft until he accepts it.97 That same section, how-
ever, leaves open the possibility that a drawee may be obligated to the holder
or to another person in contract, tort, or otherwise for representations made
about the drafting arrangement. 98 In First National Bank v. Anderson Ford-
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. 99 a bank gave oral drafting instructions to a car dealer
indicating that the bank would approve a draft of $13,000 to finance a truck
purchase by one of the car dealer's customers. Based on this representation,
the truck was sold. On the following day the bank told the dealer that a
mistake had occurred and that the bank would not finance the purchase. In
an action by the dealer the court applied the provisions of section 3.409 to
find the bank liable in negligence, based upon the representations made by
the bank. 100 According to the court, this was a case of first impression in
Texas. 01 The court's decision is, therefore, of particular interest.
Another type of acceptance that has been recognized by the Texas courts
is the issuance of a cashier's check.' 0 2 In such cases, the bank is deemed to
have accepted the instrument when it is issued and cannot stop payment
after the acceptance has occurred. '0 3 The rule of thumb is simply: payment
cannot be stopped on a cashier's check. The court had no difficulty in apply-
ing this rule in University State Bank v. Allied Conroe Bank 104 In University
otherwise specify, they are taken to be a guaranty of payment. Id. § 3.416(c) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968).
91. 698 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
92. Id. at 233.
93. 704 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
94. Id. at 430; see TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5527, § 1 (repealed 1985), reenacted as
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986).
95. 704 S.W.2d at 430. It should be mentioned that if a note is a simple demand note that
does not contain a maturity date, the statute of limitations begins to run upon the note's stated
date or upon its date of issue. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.122(a)(2) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968).
96. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.409 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
97. Id. § 3.409(a).
98. Id. § 3.409(b). The full text of that section provides: "Nothing in this section shall
affect any liability in contract, tort or otherwise arising from any letter of credit or other
obligation or representation which is not an acceptance." Id.
99. 704 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. Id. at 85.
101. Id. at 84.
102. See Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust Co., 495 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1973).
103. Id.
104. 712 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
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State Bank the court entered judgment against the issuing bank, holding that
no distinction exists between a bank's dishonoring a cashier's check and
stopping payment on a cashier's check.105
IV. BANK TRANSACTIONS
A. DTPA Claims Against Banks
Bank Liability for Misrepresenting Account Status. In First Federal Savings
& Loan Association v. Ritenour 106 a bank had advised one of its depositors
that the bank could place a "hold" on a joint account, thus requiring both
parties to the account to authorize a withdrawal of funds from it. The de-
positors, husband and wife, asked that the bank place such a hold on their
account. After execution of the hold the depositor's wife withdrew more
than $11,000 from the account on her signature alone. The depositor sued
the bank under the DTPA. The court carefully considered earlier Texas
cases10 7 on the question of whether a bank depositor could qualify as a con-
sumer for DTPA purposes. 10 8 On this issue the court concluded that the
evidence supported the depositor's theory that he had sought and received
services from the bank, thereby qualifying as a consumer under the
DTPA. 109 A dissenting opinion took the position that the case was indistin-
guishable from earlier case law disallowing bank customers' DTPA
claims;10 in the dissent's view the depositor therefore was not a consumer
for DTPA purposes. 1 '
Injunctive Relief Will Not Support the Recovery of Punitive Damages. In
Nabours v. Longview Savings & Loan Association,1" 2 another DTPA case
brought against a bank, the customers successfully proved that the bank had
made false statements in connection with a foreclosure proceeding and had
effectively waived its right to foreclose on a deed of trust. The customers,
however, failed to prove that they had suffered any actual damage. The jury
nevertheless awarded $126,000 in punitive damages, and the trial court up-
held this award as well as the grant of a permanent injunction against fore-
closure. The court of appeals reversed the award of damages, but affirmed
105. Id. at 194.
106. 704 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
107. The cases reviewed by the court included Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d
169, 176 (Tex. 1980) (filing loan application does not qualify party as a consumer for DTPA
purposes); First State Bank v. Chesshir, 613 S.W.2d 611, 612-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo),
rev'd on other grounds, 620 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1981), on remand, 634 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (bank customer's purchase of certificate of deposit did not
qualify customer as a consumer for DTPA purposes).
108. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987) (defines a consumer
as "an individual.., who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services ... )
109. 704 S.W.2d at 900.
110. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980); First State Bank v.
Chesshir, 613 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), rev'd on other grounds, 620 S.W.2d 101(Tex. 1981), on remand, 634 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
111. 704 S.W.2d at 902 (Seerden, J., dissenting).
112. 700 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1986).
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the injunctive relief.11 3
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court held that the grant of a permanent
injunction would not support an award of punitive damages.11 4 The court
noted that its decision should not be read to mean that other forms of equita-
ble relief would not support an award of punitive damages, for example, in
the case of an order entered to rescind deeds or to return property." 5 A
strong dissenting opinion argued that the majority overturned long-standing
Texas law in reaching its decision." 6 The majority also noted that it need
not reach the issue of whether the plaintiffs qualified as consumers under the
DTPA since they failed to recover damages under the Act." 7
Threats of Criminal Action to Collect Debt. The Texas Debt Collection
Act" 8 prohibits a variety of debt collection practices including fraud,
threats, and coercion. A violation of the Debt Collection Act is defined as a
violation of the DTPA, and the remedies of the DTPA are made avail-
able. 19 In Brown v. Oaklawn Bank ' 20 a bank customer went to his bank to
close his savings account. The teller told the customer his account balance
was some $9,000. The customer said that the amount was too high by sev-
eral thousand dollars. The teller checked with a supervising officer and con-
firmed the $9,000 amount. That amount was then paid to the customer and
he deposited the sum in accounts he had at a credit union. Later that day,
the bank discovered that it had overstated the depositor's balance because of
an error in its bookkeeping entries, contacted the customer, and demanded
return of $7,500. The customer refused, saying that he thought everything
had been taken care of earlier and that he would ask his attorney to handle
the matter. Not content with this answer, the bank proceeded to send letters
to the customer threatening criminal prosecution. 12
The bank brought a civil action to collect the overpayment, and the debtor
counterclaimed for alleged violations of the Debt Collections Practices Act.
The bank defended on the statutory ground that a violation of the Act oc-
curs only when "in fact the debtor has not violated any criminal laws."' 22
The trial court made a finding of fact that the debtor had violated criminal
laws, and that the bank had, therefore, stated a good defense. The Texas
Supreme Court held that the bank had not established a defense because the
trial court could not find the debtor guilty of criminal violations absent an
113. 673 S.W.2d 357-362 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984), aff'd, 700 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.
1986).
114. 700 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. 1986).
115. Id. at 904.
116. Id. at 905 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
117. 700 S.W.2d at 905. Because of the failure to recover damages, the plaintiffs were also
unable to recover attorney's fees. Id.
118. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, §§ 11.01-.11 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
119. Id. § 11.11.
120. 718 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 1986).
121. One of the bank directors was the local prosecuting attorney.




underlying criminal proceeding.1 23 In its opinion the court stated: "We
decline to accept a standard giving the creditor the power and authority to
determine the guilt or innocence of an individual debtor. Similarly, a trial
court cannot assume that responsibility in a civil proceeding to enforce the
debt."124 The standard announced by the court imposes such a high burden
of proof on the creditor that creditors should simply avoid threats of crimi-
nal prosecution to collect debts.
B. AcTIONS IN RESPONSE TO COURT ORDERS
Default by Bank in Garnishment Proceeding. As a debtor to its depositors, a
bank is frequently the subject of garnishment proceedings. Since the gar-
nishing creditor rarely knows the exact amount of a depositor's bank ac-
count, it is incumbent upon the bank to answer the writ of garnishment.
One of the risks a bank incurs for failing to answer a writ is illustrated in
First National Bank v. Peterson.125 The trial court entered a default judg-
ment for $48,831.77 against a bank on a writ of garnishment even though the
bank only had a $312.68 balance in the debtor's deposit account. Three
bank officers read the writ, but the only action taken was to freeze the ac-
count. None of the bank's officers notified an attorney about the writ; nor
did the bank advise the issuing court that it had frozen the account. The
bank moved to reopen the judgment claiming accident or mistake in failing
to answer the writ. The court denied this motion on the ground that the
facts indicated that the bank had acted intentionally or with conscious indif-
ference rather than through accident or mistake when it failed to answer the
writ. 126
Negligence in Transferring Funds Between Accounts. In American National
Bank v. Sneed's Shipbuliding, Inc. 127 the bankruptcy judge issued a written
order to place a bankrupt debtor's funds in an interest bearing account. The
order required the signatures of both the judge and the debtor's president for
withdrawals from the account. The judge later orally ordered the bank to
transfer the funds to a noninterest bearing checking account. While the
bank questioned the judge about the transfer order, it did not notify the
debtor of the order or the transfer. When the debtor learned about the
transfer almost one year later it had already lost a significant amount of
interest income. The court held the bank liable to the debtor for the lost
interest because of its failure to notify the debtor about the order and the
transfer.1 28 The court took pains to make it clear that its finding of negli-
gence was not based on the bank's compliance with the court order, but on
the bank's failure to notify the bankrupt debtor about the order as the other
123. 718 S.W.2d at 680.
124. Id.
125. 709 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. Id. at 280.
127. 703 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
128. Id. at 339.
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signatory on the account. 129
C. Suits Against Customers
Recovery of Overpayments. If a bank erroneously overcredits a customer's
account and the customer subsequently withdraws the money, elementary
jurisprudence seems to dictate that the bank should have some cause of ac-
tion to recover the overpayment. Equally elementary jurisprudence seems to
dictate that conversion is the proper cause of action for detention of the
bank's funds. This elementary approach is incorrect according to the court
in Vickory v. Summit National Bank.130 According to the court, the cause of
action is not conversion, but an action for debt because the relationship be-
tween a bank and a depositor is one of debtor and creditor and an erroneous
overpayment simply makes the depositor the debtor rather than the other
way around. 131 The heart of the dispute in Vickory was whether the two-
year statute of limitations for conversion 132 or the four-year statute of limita-
tions for debt 133 applied to the bank's claim. The court's decision that the
bank brought an action for debt 134 allowed the bank to benefit from the
longer statute of limitations period.
Interpleaders and Conflicts of Laws. In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 135 the
supreme court abandoned the rule that the law of the place of the making of
a contract governs the contract. Instead, the court adopted the more mod-
em approach that the law of the place with the most significant relationship
to the contract should govern. 136 The court in Ossorio v. Leon 137 applied
this newer rule when a bank interpled claimants to a joint account after the
death of one party to the account because of conflicting claims to the dece-
dent's share of the account. All of the claimants were citizens of Mexico,
and the only contact that Texas had with the dispute was the deposit of
funds in a Texas bank. The court held that the law of Mexico should apply
to determine the rights of the respective claimants since Mexico had the
most significant relationship to the transaction. 138
D. Setoffs
Setoffs as Against Depositors. In Texas National Bank v. Karnes' 39 a bank
repossessed a car purchased by the depositors' son under a loan guaranteed
129. Id.
130. 702 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. Id. at 325.
132. TEX. CIV. PRACT. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986).
133. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5527, § 1 (repealed 1985), reenacted as TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. S 16.004(a) (Vernon 1986).
134. 702 S.W.2d at 325.
135. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
136. Id. at 421.
137. 705 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
138. Id. at 223.
139. 711 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. App.-Beaumont), aff'd in part, rev'd & vac'd in part, 717
S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1986) (court vacated only award of attorneys' fees and punitive damages).
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by his mother. The bank failed to dispose of the car in the manner required
by section 9.504 of the Code.14 Under the rule of Tanenbaum v. Economics
Laboratory, Inc. 141 the bank was not entitled to a deficiency. 142 Nonethe-
less, the bank set off an alleged deficiency of some $3,000 against the savings
account of the depositors without notifying them. The court of appeals al-
lowed the depositors to recover the amount of the setoff143 and also awarded
punitive damages on the ground that the bank had acted tortiously. 144 The
Texas Supreme Court disagreed, however, because the only jury finding was
that the bank had failed to act in a commercially reasonable manner in the
disposition of the collateral. 145 According to the court, the obligation to
dispose of repossessed collateral in a commercially reasonable manner "is an
implied covenant in all contracts governed by Article 9 .... [Tlhe bank's
breach of this covenant gave rise to a cause of action which sounds in con-
tract."' 146 Because the jury found damages only for violation of the implied
covenant and not damages in tort, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for
the amount of the improper setoff, but could not recover punitive
damages. 147
In In re Williams 148 a depositor sued a bank for wrongful setoff. The
depositor failed to recover because the court held that the bank could hold
the depositor's funds subject to a right of setoff based on the depositor's
indebtedness to the bank.' 49 The more difficult issue was whether the bank
could impose an administrative freeze on the account pending determination
of its substantive rights in the depositor's bankruptcy proceeding. Under the
facts before the court, the bank account was cash collateral under section
363 of the Bankruptcy Code' 50 and the court faced a conflict in decisions on
this issue. Some cases had permitted banks to apply administrative freezes
under section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code' 51 as a necessary self-help method
of preventing dissipation of the cash collateral before the bank had an oppor-
tunity to have its setoff claim heard in bankruptcy court.152 Other cases had
regarded the administrative freeze as a violation of the automatic stay of
post-petition setoffs. 53
140. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987) (repos-
session had occurred in 1979, and the vehicle was not sold until 1984).
141. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
142. Id. at 772 (creditor may not retain collateral and sue for deficiency without compli-
ance with notice requirement of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Vernon Supp.
1987)).
143. 711 S.W.2d at 397.
144. Id.
145. 717 S.W.2d at 903.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 61 Bankr. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
149. Id. at 574.
150. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1982).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1982 & Supp. 1 1986).
152. See, e.g., In re Edgins, 36 Bankr. 480, 484 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984); Stann v. Mid Amer-
ican Credit Union, 39 Bankr. 246, 248 (D. Kan. 1984); Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central
Fidelity Bank, 22 Bankr. 747, 750 (W.D. Va. 1982).
153. See, e.g., In re Wildcat Constr. Co., 57 Bankr. 981, 986 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986); In re
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The court reasoned that sections 542 and 362 could be reconciled by the
rule of statutory construction that the specific language in section 542 con-
trols the general language in section 362.1 54 In the court's view section 542
specifically refers to the use of an administrative freeze, while section 362
refers generally to post-petition setoffs.155 The bank, therefore, acted prop-
erly in imposing a freeze on the depositor's account pending a hearing on the
validity of the bank's right of setoff.15 6 The court noted that a bank is liable
for actual and punitive damages if it does not have a valid right of setoff and
this risk of liability is sufficient to prevent banks from taking improper ad-
vantage of the right to impose an administrative freeze. 157
Setoffs as Against Third Parties Claiming an Interest in an Account. Since a
depositor can assign his or her interest in a bank account to a third party, the
right of setoff can sometimes become entangled with an issue of the priority
of claims between the bank and the third party assignee. In Texas Bank &
Trust Co. v. Spur Security Bank 158 the assignee of a nonnegotiable certificate
of deposit was notified that the issuing bank had placed an administrative
freeze on the account because it might have a claim to the underlying de-
posit. On appeal from a summary judgment for the assignee bank the appel-
late court ruled that a fact issue existed as to whether the hold had occurred
before the assignee had given notice of the assignment. 15 9 The resolution of
that issue required trial on the merits to determine the priorities in the ac-
count and the validity of an attempted setoff.160
In a second case involving the assignee of a nonnegotiable certificate of
deposit, Citibank v. Interfirst Bank,' 61 the court explored the Texas equita-
ble setoff rule. The court concluded that the bank could not validly set off
the amount of its claim against the equitable interest of an assignee when the
bank was unable to show a change in its position in reliance on the deposi-
tor's continued ownership of the funds. 162 The Texas Supreme Court
adopted the equitable setoff rule in National Indemnity Co. v. Spring Branch
State Bank, 63 and Texas courts continue to follow that rule.
The rule has two parts. First, a bank cannot validly set off funds if it has
actual or constructive knowledge that the funds are held for the benefit of a
third party. 164 Second, even if a bank has no notice or knowledge of a third
Rio, 55 Bankr. 814, 817-18 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1985); In re LHG Resources, Inc., 34 Bankr.
202, 203 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983). These courts based their position on 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7)
(1982).
154. 61 Bankr. at 573.
155. Id. at 574.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 576.
158. 705 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ).
159. Id. at 354.
160. Id.
161. 784 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1986).
162. Id. at 621-22.
163. 348 S.W.2d 528, 529-31 (Tex. 1961).
164. Continental Nat'l Bank v. Great American Management & Inv., Inc., 606 S.W.2d
346, 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), see Annotation, Bank's Right to
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party's interest in the funds, the bank may not set off and retain the funds
unless it has detrimentally changed its position in reasonable reliance on the
depositor's continued ownership of the funds.165 In applying this rule the
court in Citibank found that even if the bank did not have notice of the claim
of the third-party assignee, the bank had not changed its position in reason-
able reliance on the depositor's ownership of the funds.1 66 This case is of
particular interest because, according to the court, its decision was only the
second decision in the United States to consider whether the equitable rule
applied to a priority dispute between a secured creditor under the Code and
a bank attempting to exercise its right of setoff. 167 Attorneys, when dealing
with banks, sometimes seem to overlook the second portion of the equitable
rule, and the Citibank case is helpful in developing a better understanding of
the rule.
E. Unauthorized Signatures
Negligence Contributing to Unauthorized Signatures. Under section 3.406 of
the Code168 any person whose negligence contributes to the making of an
unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the lack of authorization
against a holder or payor who pays the instrument in good faith and in ac-
cordance with reasonable commercial standards. In First City National
Bank v. FDIC 1 69 a bank acted as a collecting bank for some checks and as a
payor bank for other checks. The court held that the bank could not assert
the negligence of the payee as a defense to its own liability when the bank
failed to introduce any evidence showing that it had acted according to rea-
sonable commercial standards. 170
Another aspect of the potential liability of collecting banks for dealing
with checks bearing forged endorsements is the question of whether the code
rules on conversion of instruments have displaced other remedies available
at common law. 171 In Peerless Insurance Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank 172
the court held that the rightful owner of checks could maintain a common
law action for money had and received against a collecting bank that had
collected the funds under forged endorsements. 173 The underlying issue in
Peerless was whether the two-year statute of limitations for conversion
Apply Third Person's Funds, Deposited in Debtor's Name, On Debtor's Obligation, 8
A.L.R.3d 235, 239 (1966).
165. Continental, 606 S.W.2d at 348.
166. 784 F.2d at 622.
167. Id. The other decision is First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Midland Nat'l Bank, 76 Wis. 2d
662, 251 N.W.2d 829, 831-32 (1977) (bank precluded from exercising setoff against assignee's
funds). Interestingly enough, another decision invoking the equitable setoff rule was handed
down by the Fifth Circuit at almost the same time as Citibank. See Energetics, Inc. v. Allied
Bank, 784 F.2d 1300, 1302 (5th Cir. 1986).
168. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.406 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
169. 782 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1986).
170. Id. at 1349.
171. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
172. See 791 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1986).
173. Id. at 1180.
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claims174 or the four-year statute of limitations for actions for money had
and received 175 controlled. The decision allowed the plaintiff to go forward
on the claim under the longer limitations period. 176
F. Wire Transfer Problems
Forged Wire Transfer Orders. In Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas American
Bank 177 the Fifth Circuit determined that the Code rules allocating loss be-
tween parties affected by forgeries in commercial paper cases should be ap-
plied by analogy to wire transfers. 178 Bradford Trust Company of Boston,
the party in the position of the drawee bank, had received a forged order
directing it to initiate a wire transfer of $800,000 from the account of one of
its customers to an account at Texas American Bank in Houston purport-
edly held by the same customer. In fact, while the name of the customer was
correct, the account number listed for the bank in Houston was for another
customer. 179 Bradford Trust followed the instructions on the forged order
and Texas American, without checking to see if the name and account
number matched, deposited the funds in accordance with the account
number. The funds were then effectively used by the con artists who had
forged the order to buy rare coins and gold bullion from a coin dealer in
Houston.
When Bradford Trust discovered the scheme it demanded that Texas
American and the coin dealer reimbuse them. Both refused. In the action
by Bradford Trust to recover the funds on the ground of negligence by Texas
American by its incorrect deposit of the funds,180 the district court found
both banks negligent and applied the Texas comparative negligence statute
to divide the loss equally between the banks. On appeal the court acknowl-
edged an "equitable tug" to reach the same result, but noted that the com-
parative negligence statute applied to "damages for negligence resulting in
death or injury to persons or property."181 Because the court doubted that
Texas courts would apply the comparative negligence provisions to cases of
commercial loss, the court decided instead to use the Uniform Commercial
Code as guidance for a rule of decision. 182
174. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986).
175. Id. § 16.004.
176. 791 F.2d at 1181.
177. 790 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1986).
178. Id. at 409.
179. The ingenious part of the scheme lay in this deliberate use of the customer's real name
and a misstated account number. Unless Bradford Trust took steps to confirm the transaction
with its customer or unless the receiving bank checked the name against the account number,
the funds would end up in the wrong account and be available for withdrawal or use by the
wrongdoers. Oddly enough, Brandord Trust had been tricked by a similar scheme in 1980 and
the company had instituted internal security procedures to prevent a recurrence. The com-
pany, however, did not follow those procedures in this transaction.
180. Bradford Trust had settled the claim against the coin dealer; thus, the dealer was not
involved in the litigation.
181. Id. at 409 (citing TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (repealed 1985), reenacted as




In applying the Code the court identified two factors as underlying the
Code loss allocation scheme: "1) which party was in the best position to
avoid the loss; and 2) which solution promotes the policy of finality in com-
mercial transactions?" 183 According to the court, both factors pointed to-
ward placing the entire loss upon Bradford Trust since it was the party who
dealt with the wrongdoer and also made the final payment under the forged
transfer order.18
4
Overpayments by Wire Order from Drawer's Account. In another wire trans-
fer case, Walker v. Texas Commerce Bank,18 5 the payor bank erroneously
transferred $25,000 more than its customer had orally requested. While
holding that the Code does not cover wire transfer orders and that common
law principles governed the transaction unless displaced by provisions of the
Code, the court nonetheless found the Code rules consistent with common
law duties of good faith and ordinary care imposed on a bank to govern
relations with its customer.18 6 The bank was held liable for the erroneous
overpayment. 1
87
V. LETTERS OF CREDIT
A. Letter of Credit or Guaranty?
While a bank most commonly issues a letter of credit and clearly denomi-
nates it as such, any person may issue a letter of credit if it meets certain
standards set out in section 5.102 of the Code. 18 The critical language
states,
(a) This chapter applies ... (2) to a credit issued by a person other
than a bank if the credit requires that the draft or demand for
payment be accompanied by a document of title; and (3) to a credit
issued by a bank or other person if the credit ... conspicuously
states that it is a letter of credit or is conspicuously so entitled. 18 9
In BA Commercial Corp v. Hynutek, Inc. 190 a corporation had issued a
document entitled Standby Guarantee of Payment, which purported to guar-
antee the debts of another company up to $320,000. The guarantee was
valid until December 31, 1983. The guarantee required certified written no-
tice in a specified form for demands for payment under the guarantee, but
did not require documents of title. After the principal debtor had defaulted
the creditor made a series of demands for payment under the guarantee, the
last demand dated January 31, 1984. The corporate guarantor argued that
its guarantee was a letter of credit and the creditor had failed to comply
strictly with the conditions in the credit agreement, including a failure to
183. Id.
184. Id. at 410.
185. 635 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
186. Id. at 682.
187. Id. at 685.
188. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
189. Id.
190. 705 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
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make a proper demand before the credit expired. The court held, however,
that the document issued by the corporation did not meet any Of the relevant
definitions in section 5.102 and that it should be classed as a contract of
guaranty rather than a letter of credit. 191 As a contract of guaranty there
was no rule of strict compliance and no rule that the creditor demand pay-
ment before expiration. 192 The only requirement was that a covered indebt-
edness must arise before the expiration date. 193 The corporation was held
liable up to the stated limit of liability. 194
In another case involving a guaranty, Campbell v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 195 the guarantor claimed that an agreement with the corporation and
the other guarantors released him from liability for the corporation's debts.
There was no evidence, however, that the guarantor had ever notified the
creditor bank of the release or of revocation of the guaranty. The guarantor
was held liable for a continuing guaranty.196
B. Dishonor Under a Credit
What Constitutes "Fraud in the Transaction?" The most significant aspect of
a letter of credit is the obligation of the issuer to make payment without
regard to any underlying contractual disputes between the customer and the
beneficiary if the required documents conform to the credit. 197 The primary
exception to the issuer's obligation occurs when fraud underlies the transac-
tion. 198 In such cases, unless a draft drawn under the credit has been negoti-
ated to a good faith purchaser, the customer may seek injunction against the
issuer to prevent payment under the credit. 199
In Philipp Brothers, Inc. v. Oil Country Specialists, Ltd. 200 the customer
bought oil field casing pipe. The pipe delivered by the seller was of substan-
tially lower quality than called for by the contract. The customer cancelled
the deal and refused to pay a ten percent restocking fee specified in the con-
tract. The seller then attempted to draw against a standby letter of credit
that the buyer had supplied as part of the original transaction. The buyer
sought to enjoin payment of the draft by the issuing bank on the ground that
the quality of the pipe was so low that the seller was guilty of fraud in the
underlying transaction within the terms of section 5.114 of the Code. 201 The
court held that evidence of rejection rates for the pipe ranging from twelve
percent to one hundred percent for various lots of the pipe went beyond a
simple breach of warranty claim and "were pervasive enough to render the
191. Id. at 716.
192. Id. at 715.
193. Id. at 716.
194. Id. at 717.
195. 705 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
196. Id. at 402-03. The parties did not raise the issue of whether the guarantee should be
construed as a letter of credit.
197. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 89, § 18-1, at 706-07.
198. See id. § 18-6, at 734.
199. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114(b) (rex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
200. 709 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist] 1986, writ dism'd).
201. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114(b) (rex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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entire inventory virtually worthless, thus destroying the legitimate purposes
of the letter of credit. ' 20 2 An order granting a temporary injunction against
honor was affirmed.203
Even if a customer has not sought to enjoin an issuer from honoring docu-
ments drawn under a letter of credit, the issuer may choose to dishonor the
documents if fraud in the transaction is present, but the fraud must be of the
same kind as would support an injunction against honor.204 A good faith
belief that such fraud has occurred is not an adequate ground for dishonor;
the issuer must have proof of the fraud before dishonoring. 20 5
VI. DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
A. Duties of Carriers
Duties of Carrier in CO.D. Shipments. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Swest,
Inc. 206 the Texas Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the lower appel-
late courts on the scope of a carrier's duty in collecting payment on C.O.D.
shipment contracts. 20 7 In American Airlines the airline delivered goods
under a C.O.D. contract in exchange for a certified check that was actually a
forgery. The Dallas court of appeals ruled that the carrier had an absolute
duty to attempt to verify the certified check.208 Since the airline had taken
no steps to verify the check, it was held liable to the shipper for the value of
the goods.209 At almost the same time that the court of appeals decided
American Airlines the San Antonio court of appeals decided the case of
Duderstadt Surveyors Supply, Inc. v. Alamo Express, Inc.210 and adopted a
rule that a carrier has a duty to use reasonable care and skill in making
collections on C.O.D. shipments. 211 Furthermore, the carrier's exercise of
reasonable care does not necessarily include a duty to verify a cashier's
check.212 In American Airlines the Texas Supreme Court rejected the abso-
lute duty approach of the court of appeals and adopted a reasonable care
standard consistent with Duderstadt.213 Since the shipments in question had
arrived after business hours and the shipper had insisted on prompt delivery,
the airline had no opportunity to verify the certified checks with the certify-
ing bank. On this basis the court held that the airline had acted with reason-
202. 709 S.W.2d at 265.
203. Id. at 266.
204. Champion Int'l Corp. v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 715 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1986, no writ).
205. United States v. Merchantile Nat'l Bank, 795 F.2d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1986).
206. 707 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1986).
207. Compare Swest, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 694 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1985), rev'd, 707 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1986) (carrier has duty to verify check tendered as
payment for C.O.D.) with Duderstadt Surveyors Supply, Inc. v. Alamo Express, Inc., 686
S.W.2d 351-355 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (carrier's duty is to use reason-
able care in making collections on C.O.D. obligations).
208. 694 S.W.2d at 402.
209. Id.
210. 686 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
211. Id. at 355.
212. Id.
213. 707 S.W.2d at 546.
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able care. 214 The court noted that a shipper could always contract for a
greater duty of care in the original shipping agreement. 215
VII. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Validity of Security Agreement
Dragnet Clauses. While chapter 9 of the Code216 simplifies much of the law
of secured transactions and gives a secured party considerable freedom from
technical rules in obtaining and perfecting a valid security interest, it does
not purport to give the secured party a completely free hand in asserting
claims to collateral. In Hannigan v. First State Bank 217 the secured creditor
attempted to use collateral given to secure loans made to joint owners of
stock as collateral for other, earlier loans made to only one of the owners.
The court had little difficulty in finding that the security interest in the stock
extended only to secure the joint loan and did not secure the separate liabili-
ties of one of the owners. 218 The court based its decision primarily on the
intent of the parties as shown in the security agreement in which the joint
owners were defined collectively as the debtor.219 Other documents in the
transaction were consistent with the court's interpretation that the parties
intended the security agreement to cover only joint loans.220
B. Description of Collateral
Adequacy of Description in a Financing Statement. In contrast to earlier
statutes governing security interests in personal property, the Code adopts a
theory of notice filing instead of transaction filing.22' The parties are not
required to place their entire arrangement in the public record, nor are they
required to identify the collateral covered by their arrangement in terms that
match the accuracy of a real property description. 222 It is sufficient if they
file a financing statement with a description that reasonably identifies the
collateral covered by the agreement. 223 The purpose of such a filing is sim-
ply to put third parties on such notice that a reasonable person would in-
quire further before making a loan to or purchase from the debtor.
The court in Marine Drilling Co. v. Hobbs Trailers224 applied this stan-
dard of notice filing to find that a financing statement that inaccurately de-
scribed property held as collateral reasonably identified the collateral and
214. Id. at 547.
215. Id.
216. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.101-.507 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
217. 700 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
218. Id. at 9.
219. Id. at 8.
220. Id.
221. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402 comment 2 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp.
1987).
222. See id.
223. Id. § 9.110 provides: "[For the purposes of this chapter] any description of personal
property or real estate is sufficient ... whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies
what is described."
224. 697 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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was not seriously misleading. The statement identified the property as a
"1976 Ford Forklift s/n 45614," even though it may have been a 1975 model
and the serial number was actually 452614.225 The court held that the se-
cured creditor's financing statement was sufficient to put a reasonably pru-
dent buyer on notice of a possible security interest in the forklift.226
Evidence introduced at trial showed that the buyer did not conduct a search
for the financing statement and that whether the equipment was a 1975 or
1976 model was unclear. This decision is consistent with the general trend
of financing statement description cases around the country. 227
Adequacy of Description in a Security Agreement. In Unicut, Inc. v. Texas
Commerce Bank 228 the court applied the same standard of reasonable iden-
tification to determine that a description of collateral in a security agreement
was sufficient. 229 The court quoted with approval the following statement
from the Official Comment to section 9.110 of the Code: "The test of suffi-
ciency of a description laid down by this section is that the description do
the job assigned to it-that it make possible the identification of the thing
described."' 230 The debtor's objection to a writ of sequestration on this
ground was denied.23 1
The debtor also objected to the issuance of the writ on the basis that the
creditor had prayed for foreclosure and the court had, instead, allowed the
secured party to take possession of the collateral after seizure. According to
the debtor, a prayer for foreclosure is tantamount to an exclusive request for
judicial sale. The court properly held that unless the secured party has spe-
cifically asked for a judicial sale, the option to pursue a private sale continues
as an available remedy. 2 32 This holding is consistent with section 9.501 of
the Code. 2
3 3
C. Resale of Collateral
Notice of Intended Resale. To effect a commercially reasonable resale under
225. Id. at 833-34.
226. Id. at 834.
227. See, e.g., In re Vintage Press, Inc., 552 F.2d 1145, 1147 (5th Cir. 1977) (error in serial
number did not vitiate description when it was otherwise sufficient); In re Delta Molded
Prods., Inc., 416 F. Supp. 938, 941-42 (N.D. Ala. 1976) (description that included model
number, type of machine, factory modifications, and a listing of auxiliary equipment held ade-
quate even though serial number was incorrect); In re Simplified Data Processing Sys., 55
Bankr. 77, 78 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985) (description of collateral as a Prime 550 and Prime 650
computer sufficient even though serial numbers not listed when debtor owned only one com-
puter of each type); McGehee v. Exchange Bank & Trust Co., 561 S.W.2d 926, 931-32 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (description of boat was sufficient even though the
model year and engine number were incorrect).
228. 704 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
229. Id. at 444.
230. Id. (citing TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.110 (comment) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1987).
231. Id. at 445.
232. Id. at 445-46.
233. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.501(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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section 9.504 of the Code234 the creditor must give notice of the intended
sale of collateral to the debtor.235 Under the'rule of Tanenbaum v. Econom-
ics Laboratory, Inc.236 a failure to give reasonable notice to the debtor will
bar the secured party from recovering a deficiency. 237 An issue that is not
entirely settled in Texas law concerns the persons entitled to receive notice,
but the case law seems to be moving in the direction of resolving this issue.
In Peck v. Mack Trucks, Inc.238 the court held that the term "debtor"
includes any guarantors of the secured obligation and that such guarantors
are entitled to receive notice of the intended sale of any collateral securing
the debt. 239 According to the court, failure to give notice to the guarantors
barred the secured party from recovering a deficiency judgment against them
under the Tanenbaum rule.24° The court also held that debtors, including
guarantors, cannot waive their rights to notice of sale, except as provided in
sections 9.501 and 9.504 of the Code, 24 1 which only permits waivers of no-
tice after default.242
The case of MBank Dallas v. Sunbelt Manufacturing, Inc. 243 also required
the secured party to notify the guarantor before selling collateral, but the
primary issue in the case was whether written notice is required or whether
oral notice will suffice. The court did not find any prior Texas cases on this
precise point and recognized a split of authority in cases from other jurisdic-
tions.244 Based primarily on the definitions of "notice" and "send" in sec-
tion 1.201 of the Code245 and the lack of. any explicit requirement of written
notice in section 9.504 of the Code,246 the court concluded that oral notice
could suffice as proper notice of sale.247 The court reasoned that the purpose
of the Code rules on notification is to require reasonable "notice sufficient to
enable the debtor to protect his interest in the collateral. '248 In the view of
the court oral notice could meet this test.249
In a third case involving the right of a guarantor to receive notice, Bexar
County National Bank v. Hernandez,250 the Texas Supreme Court agreed
that guarantors are entitled to notice when the secured party intends to sell,
but held that no notice is required when the collateral is merely transferred
234. Id. § 9.504(c).
235. Id.
236. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
237. Id. at 772.
238. 704 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
239. Id. at 585.
240. Id.
241. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.501(c), .504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
242. 704 S.W.2d at 586.
243. 710 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
244. Id. at 635.
245. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(26), (38) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
246. Id. § 9.540(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
247. 710 S.W.2d at 635-36.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 716 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
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under the terms of section 9.504 of the Code.25' In cases of simple transfer
the notice that is required is notice of sale by the transferee.
252
Burden of Proving Commercially Reasonable Resale. Another issue that
Texas courts have not completely resolved is whether the secured party or
the debtor has the burden of proving that a sale was or was not conducted in
a commercially reasonable manner. In Sunjet, Inc. v. Ford Motor Credit
Co. 253 the court exhaustively collected cases from other states and concluded
that the "vast majority of other jurisdictions hold that the secured party
must prove the commercial reasonableness of his disposition of the collateral
when he seeks to collect a deficiency judgment. '254 The court adopted the
majority rule and held that the secured party had failed to meet the burden
of proving commercial reasonableness. 255 An earlier decision by the same
court of appeals had assumed, without deciding, that the burden of proof
was on the secured party. 256
Because the law is an evolutionary process, a single case can sometimes be
the genesis of major changes in legal rules. From the standpoint of secured
creditors, the case of Lee v. Sabine Bank 257 is a possible source of major
change in the law governing secured creditors. In Lee the court dealt with
the foreclosure of a maritime mortgage. The debtor raised an issue about the
fair market valuation of the foreclosed vessel as compared to the price paid
for the vessel in the judicial sale. In considering this question the court re-
viewed a case258 decided under the federal Ship Mortgage Act,259 a case that
was not binding precedent for the case at bar. The court concluded that a
significant proven disparity between the judicial sale price and the appraisal
value of a vessel should give the debtor a deficiency offset measured by the
fair market value of the vessel as opposed to the foreclosure sale price when
the secured party is the successful bidder at the sale.26° In dictum the court
said:
We are persuaded that the rule [described above] is fair and reasonable,
251. Id. at 938-39; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(e) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp.
1987) provides:
A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, indorsement, repur-
chase agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of collateral from the
secured party or is subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of
the secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the
collateral under this chapter.
252. 716 S.W.2d at 939.
253. 703 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
254. Id. at 288.
255. Id. at 288-89. Sunjet was subsequently cited in Achimon v. J.I. Case Credit Corp.,
715 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (Stephens, J., concurring).
256. Schultz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 704 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las 1986, no writ). This approach seems to have been the assumption of the court in M.P.
Crum Co. v. First Southwest Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 704 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1986, no writ).
257. 708 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
258. Id. at 584 (citing Walter E. Heller & Co., v. O/S SONNY V., 595 F.2d 968-972 (5th
Cir. 1979)).
259. 46 U.S.C. § 911 - 984 (1982).
260. 708 S.W.2d at 584.
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and should be applied in Texas law. But we know of no reason why it
should be restricted to ships. A lender who has secured collateral,
whether personalty or reality is under a trust arrangement with the bor-
rower, in the event of foreclosure, to make an honest effort to reduce the
loan as much as possible by securing a fair price for the collateral. 26 1
The court held that "when a lender or its surrogate purchases collateral to
secure a loan given by a borrower, and where there is a probable significant
disparity between the sales price of the property and its fair market value,
the borrower may contest the sale and present evidence contending such. '262
The danger to secured creditors in the Lee decision is the approach taken
to decide the fair market value issue. The secured creditor has some protec-
tion under section 9.507 of the Code which provides that "[Tihe fact that a
better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a
different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself suffi-
cient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable
manner. ' 263 Under the Lee approach a debtor can easily argue that
although a significant proven disparity in price does not make a sale com-
mercially unreasonable, the debtor should, nonetheless, be entitled to an off-
set for the amount of disparity that is proven. If accepted, this argument
could sometimes result in a considerable reduction in the amount of recover-
able deficiency judgments. For mortgage lenders the risk may be even
greater because no statute parallels section 9.507 of the Code. It is too early
to tell whether the Lee dictum will make its way into the general Texas law,
but secured lenders should be aware of its implications.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 585.
263. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.507(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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